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Abstract 
 
Air traffic is expected to double within the next 20 years, which requires large changes in airspace 
structure and organisation. The aim of this paper is to determine what is required for a safety validation 
approach to be appropriate for handling such large changes, and to test if existing approaches already 
satisfy this requirement. To this purpose, a consolidated set of indicators has been developed, each of 
which describes one required aspect of a safety validation approach for large changes, and the complete 
set describes all aspects. The consolidated set includes indicators related to the scoping of safety 
validation, to coverage of certain aspects of the operational concept, to risk assessment, to feedback to 
concept of operations development, to organisation of safety assessment, and to supporting decision 
and policy makers. Subsequently, the indicators are used to evaluate current safety assessment 
approaches in air transport. This shows needs for development of approaches towards safety 
assessment of large changes in air transport operations. 
 
Introduction 
 
Air traffic is expected to double within the next 20 years, which requires large changes in airspace 
structure and organisation. Such large changes require an appropriate safety validation1 before such 
changes can be implemented. Obviously, a safety validation can be done in different ways, and the 
quality of the result will depend on how the safety validation process is done, on the quality of the input 
and the experts used, which safety issues were evaluated, and which aspects of the operation were 
sufficiently covered. In order to take advantage of safety validation support methods from other safety 
critical industries, (ref. 8) developed  a database of safety methods (ref. 10). This database contains 
over 600 methods from various domains, including aviation. Reference 8 also reports practical 
experience in using this data base for the search of relevant safety methods. Based on this kind of 
experience we felt that a complete and consistent search of such database asked for the development of 
an appropriate set of safety validation quality indicators.  
 
Using reference 2 as a starting point, in reference 9 we studied principles for a safety validation 
framework for major changes in air transport operations. The systematic development of a set of safety 
validation quality indicators made part of this study. The aim of the current paper is to explain the 
process Phases that we followed for the development and application of this set of indicators. In Phase 
1, potentially relevant candidate indicators are identified. In Phase 2, these candidate indicators are 
analysed. In Phase 3, these indicators are consolidated and further detailed. In Phase 4, the set of 
consolidated indicators is used to identify needs for improvement of an established approach. In Phase 
5, the safety methods database is searched for methods to support these needs for improvement. Phases 
1 through 4 are described in the current paper. Phase 5 has not yet been addressed, and will be subject 
of follow-up research. 
 
 
Phase 1: Identification of Candidate Indicators 
 
The indicator development process started with the identification of as many as possible candidate 
indicators, using sources from literature and through conducting a brainstorm session with experts. The 
brainstorm session provided 91 candidate indicators. Participants of this brainstorm were qualified   
representatives of the Netherlands Ministry of Transport, of the Netherlands Air Traffic Control service 
provider, of the Netherlands Netherlands National Supervisory Authority, and of Eurocontrol (Brussels 
and Bretigny-sur-Orge), complemented with NLR experts on safety validation and air transport 
operational concept development. 
                                                          
1 Commonly, ‘validation’ is defined as answering the question “are we building the right system?”, as 
opposed to ‘verification’, which is defined as answering the question “are we building the system 
right?” 
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The literature sources used are references 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 14 and 15. This provided 108 candidate 
indicators. Reference 1 contains a directory of evaluated techniques to assess the dependability of 
critical computer systems. Reference 2 identifies the need to develop an ICAO global integrated system 
wide approach in aviation safety assessment that integrates all components of the aviation system in a 
balanced way, and lists indicators that this approach should satisfy. Reference 4 gives information 
quality guidelines to US Federal agencies, issued by the US Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 
Reference 5 contains a collection of hazard analysis and safety assessment techniques for use in the 
ATM/ATC domain. Reference 6 contains a collection of evaluated (technical) system safety analysis 
techniques. Reference 14 is a human reliability assessors guide, providing indicators for the evaluation 
of human reliability assessment techniques. Reference 15 contains a collection of evaluated techniques 
dealing with identifying human errors in high risk complex systems.  
 
Finally, 16 additional candidate indicators were identified by the authors of this report during the 
course of the study. The result was a list of 215 candidate indicators, amongst which some doubles. In 
order to keep the consolidation process of this long list of candidate indicators manageable, the 
candidate indicators were divided over the five initial groups described in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 — Initial Groups of Candidate Indicators 
Group Candidate indicator group description 
Feedback Related to interactions with, and effective feedback to operational concept design; also 
including communication of safety results with operational concept designers; related to 
appropriate coverage by the safety assessment framework of certain operation aspects (like 
human factors, interactions between operation elements, procedures, etc.), essential to make the 
feedback effective; and related to interactions with decision makers, and other authorities. 
Application Related to the kinds of changes to air transport operations that the safety assessment framework 
should be able to handle, e.g. major changes, Single European Sky, etc. 
Acceptability  Related to transparency and international acceptability (and harmonisation), e.g. by ICAO. 
Compliance Related to compliance with certain safety assessment framework regulations; and related to 
making effective use of existing methods and norms. 
Methods Related to particular safety assessment steps that the safety assessment framework should 
include; and related to more general qualities that the safety assessment framework should 
have, e.g. be systematic. 
 
 
Phase 2: Analysis of Candidate Indicators 
 
In the second Phase, for each of the five initial groups, the potentially relevant candidate indicators are 
summarised and analysed through an iterative process, in which review comments of the project 
Supervision Group2 have been incorporated. 
 
Analysis of Feedback Group:  This subset covers candidate indicators that are related to the air 
transport operation design and lifecycle, and those related to interactions with decision makers and 
other authorities.  
In summary, this group of candidate indicators express that a safety assessment framework should be 
able to provide effective safety results after each major air transport operation design stage, including 
the early stages. Here, the word “effective” is made more concrete by: 
- The safety assessment should fit in the planning of operation design. In particular: Safety 
assessment results should be produced relatively quickly, in order not to slow down the operation 
design process; The framework should be able to produce results even if the input data is of low 
quality and /or is subject to change, e.g. as applicable in the earlier operation development stages, 
e.g. by inclusion of sensitivity analysis, and by allowing for regional flexibility; 
- The framework should give insight into: Whether the air transport operation satisfies a safety 
design target, although in the first stages of operation lifecycle, the feedback could be in terms of 
‘safety targets’. In particular, the framework should be quantitative since showing safety priorities 
is far more efficient with quantified models which in the end enable a cost-effectiveness 
evaluation; Where the design can be further developed while improving safety; A feeling for the 
                                                          
2 The indicator development process was supported and reviewed by a Supervision Group with 
representatives of Eurocontrol, DGTL, LVNL, and Inspectorate V&W. 
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 impact of major changes on safety; The overall contributions to aviation risk; The relative 
importance of different accident categories and the causal factors to risk; The contributions in both 
causing and preventing aviation accidents; The relative importance of the different phases of the 
gate-to-gate cycle, e.g. the effects of strategic versus tactical measures; How much room there is 
for meeting the safety targets; The effects of interdependencies between different sub-systems.  
- The framework should be able to produce results that are easily communicated to the air transport 
operation designers; The results should be transparent to, be acceptable to and connect to the 
intuition of the operation concept designers (“perceived validity”). 
- The safety assessment should also: Investigate changes in the interactions between different 
system elements; Investigate changes in the interfaces between different system elements; 
Investigate procedures, dynamical aspects, training issues, humans, equipment; (hardware and 
software), organisation, managerial aspects; Support a total systems approach and consider all 
specific phases of flight; Incorporate communication and navigation performance; Cover strategic, 
pre-tactical and tactical control elements; Address the identification of non-functional hazards; 
Cover Safety Management and monitoring activities. 
 
Discussion and synthesis:  Key to the safety assessment framework needed is that it should provide 
effective feedback to operational concept development, during all operation lifecycle stages, with 
special emphasis to the earlier stages. A second important aspect is related to timing. The safety 
assessment should fit in the planning of the design, and must therefore not need too much time to 
produce results. A third aspect, related to the second, is that the framework should be able to produce 
effective results even if the input is subject to change. These three aspects can be translated into 
concrete indicators, Feedback and communication, Flexibility, and Information / data needed. A 
fourth aspect is related to transparency of the result to be provided to the operation designers. For this, 
we include an indicator on how well the safety assessment process ensures that the result is transparent. 
Safety assessment results that are conflicting with the intuition of experienced domain experts may be 
acceptable if the safety assessors can convincingly explain why. For major changes, the safety effect 
may not at all be predictable, even by experienced experts. Hence, feedback and communication with 
domain experts are important qualities for the safety assessment framework, and this is translated into 
indicator Transparency of results. A fifth aspect is the depth of the assessment and the depth of 
coverage of all concept elements by the framework. An important element will be that the framework 
should cover all interactions between the concept elements. Therefore, this is formulated as a separate 
indicator, Interactions and environment. A sixth aspect concerns breaking down a safety target to the 
level of detail required, indicator Safety Target breakdown. Three additional aspects are related to 
interactions beyond operation designers, i.e. those related to decision makers, to regulatory authorities, 
and to safety oversight. These are translated into three more indicators, Support to decision makers, 
Support to regulatory authorities, and Support to safety oversight.  
  
Analysis of Application Group:  This subset contains candidate indicators which are related to kinds of 
changes to air transport operations. In summary, these candidate indicators make clear that the 
framework should be flexible, and applicable to a wide range of (future) air traffic and flight 
operations; But in particular: It should be applicable to the assessment of major changes in air transport 
operation; It should be applicable to the Netherlands airspace situation (both civil and military), or at 
least in a wide context like an extended airspace (i.e. with specific airports, including all approach and 
departure procedures, air traffic routes, separation criteria, and system performance); Ultimately, the 
framework should be applicable at an international level (e.g. Single European Sky); And be able to 
handle National implementation of operational concept designs that have been developed at 
International level.  
 
Discussion and synthesis:  Key indicator is that the framework should be applicable to the safety 
assessment of major changes in air transport operation, Transparency regarding applicability. 
Typically, major changes will involve replacement or change of procedures or re-organisation of air 
traffic control and/or airspace. Therefore, the framework should be able to cover technical systems 
(hardware and software), human factors, procedures, organisation (including culture), and institutional 
elements, implicitly including common causes. Here, regarding human factors, there are two distinct 
issues to consider: Human factors from the human operator perspective, and human factors from the 
perspective of the safety risk of conducting the operation considered. The latter includes human error. 
This can be translated into the following set of consolidated indicators: Coverage of technical systems, 
Coverage of human factors for risk, Coverage of human factors for human, Coverage of 
procedures, Coverage of organisation, and Coverage of institutional elements. 
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Analysis of Acceptability Group:  This subset of potentially relevant candidate indicators are related to 
transparency and international acceptability. In summary, these candidate indicators support the 
following:   
- The framework should be able to find support nationally and internationally. More concrete 
indicators are: Communicability to outside world; Accessibility to international forums; 
Acceptability by Inspectorate V&W and DGTL as a means to develop safety cases; Acceptability 
for international standardisation; Acceptability to regulatory and political bodies; Acceptability to 
scientific community; Expert review; 
- The framework should be acceptable to assessors. According to one candidate indicator, this is 
most likely met by methods that require least resources and which have been most extensively 
applied. Hence, related indicators are: Resources required; Mastery required; User-friendliness and 
triability; Availability of supporting tools; Maturity;  
- The framework should be transparent to experts. This is made more concrete by: The safety 
assessment results should be traceable; here some indicators related to traceability and verifiability 
are: Auditability; Documentability; Observability; Availability; Comparative validity; 
Consistency; Structuredness; Reproducibility; Transparency; Compatibility; Quality, i.e. Utility, 
Objectivity and Integrity; Perceived validity.  
 
Discussion and synthesis:  A key indicator is that the framework can collect support for the approach, 
nationally and internationally. To do so, not only technical but also political aspects need to be 
addressed. For example, several organisations have already invested in a safety assessment framework 
of their own, and will want to see that one implemented internationally, rather than another one. On the 
other hand, if the new framework can really show to have advantages above existing ones, the support 
will be found easier. One indicator that may support this asks whether the method is able to withstand 
criticism, Criticism. Another set of candidate indicators is related to acceptability to safety assessors, 
and the people who are going to pay for performing the safety assessment of a new operation. They 
will be interested to know what applying the framework requires in terms of resources, e.g. number of 
experts required, including their training. This becomes indicator Resource requirements (equipment 
and personnel). The third set of candidate indicators is related to transparency. The problem is that 
transparency in itself may be hard to measure. It is strongly dependent on the expertise and experience 
of the person reviewing the method and results. More concrete candidate indicators related to 
transparency are listed in the summary above. It may not be considered logical or required to include 
all of these indicators in our eventual list. A relevant selection may be sufficient. Two indicators that 
may be considered most relevant are Documentability, Documentability of process steps, i.e. the 
degree to which the technique lends itself to auditable documentation, and Consistency, Indicator 
Consistency, which measures that if the method is used on two occasions by independent experts, 
reasonably similar results are derived. Documentability may also cover auditability and observability to 
some extent, and Consistency may also cover structuredness and reproducibility to some extent, such 
that these four additional indicators are also more or less covered. 
 
Analysis of Compliance Group:  This subset of potentially relevant candidate indicators are related to 
international norms and developments. In summary, the candidate indicators support the following: 
- Framework should connect with International Norms. To be more concrete, Framework should be 
compliant to Eurocontrol’s ESARR 4 and the EU’s Common Requirements; Framework should be 
compatible to existing regulations; Framework should be adaptable to future regulations. 
- Framework should make effective use of existing national and international methodological 
developments. Some concrete example indicators are: Ease of integration with / compatibility with 
other approaches; Development potential. 
- However, the development of the framework should also be open to innovation and not be biased 
towards existing methods: it may be that currently existing methods are not satisfactory; 
- Framework should give a large ‘push’ to international developments, for example Eurocontrol risk 
classification scheme development. 
 
Discussion and synthesis:  An important indicator, which is also necessary for international 
acceptability, is that the framework should be compliant with international norms and regulations. 
There are several such regulations, and in addition, some are under development. Some international 
regulations are ESARR 4, the Common Requirements (CR) of the EU, and regulations posed by ICAO. 
There are relevant points of criticism regarding ESARR 4 and the Common Requirements, and it is 
possible that the regulations will be updated in the near future to take this criticism into account. 
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 However, throughout the states, ESARR 4 is regarded as a standard, and in many places, ESARR 4 and 
/ or CR compliance is considered essential for acceptability. So, we definitely should take them well 
into account. In addition, there may be other requirements, e.g. aircraft-related certification / 
performance requirements that may be relevant for air traffic. This can be translated into one indicator 
Compliance to ESARRs, CR, ICAO. The indicators related to making use of and giving a large push 
to existing developments will not be translated into a specific indicator here, but will be incorporated 
more indirectly in the framework to be developed: This report will take some internationally well 
regarded methodologies as reference points for the framework to be developed. In addition, we intend 
to look beyond these existing methodologies and try to include some innovative ideas to complement 
them towards satisfying the project objectives. This, and the efforts to find international and national 
support for the framework, should ensure a large push to international developments.  
 
Analysis of Methods Group:  This subset of potentially relevant candidate indicators are related to 
safety assessment methods used by the framework. In summary these candidate indicators support the 
following: 
- The framework should cover the seven (or eight) stages of a generic safety assessment process (ref. 
11 or ref 6): 1. Scoping the assessment; 2. Learning the nominal system; 3. Identifying hazards; 4. 
Combining hazards; 5. Evaluating risk; 6. Supporting risk mitigation; 7. Monitoring / verifying 
actual risk; 8. Feedback and communication (has to be part of each of the other stages). 
- With some particular remarks to these steps being: The safety target should be set outside the 
safety assessment; The framework should support a good breakdown of the risk classification 
scheme into smaller risks and support a definition of safety targets compatible with the scope and 
level of detail in which the concept has been developed; Framework should include verification 
and validation steps.  
- Other qualities: Experts required; Degree of decomposition; Thoroughness; Systematism; 
Progressiveness; Application of the framework should lead to improvements in the framework 
(and in the way the framework structure is organised); Level of safety expertise required.  
 
Discussion and synthesis:  The generic safety assessment process referred to above consists of seven 
stages, with two feedback loops: One feedback concerns iterations to previous stages, and the other 
concerns feedback to operations, assessment and design. This latter stage may also be referred to as an 
“eighth” stage, although it should be part of each of the other stages. It is important that each of these 
stages gets proper treatment within the safety assessment framework, since each will have their own 
effects on operation concept design. Therefore, we decided to translate each of the first seven stages as 
a separate indicator, Scoping the assessment, Learning the nominal operation, Identifying hazards, 
Combining hazards, Evaluating risk, Supporting risk mitigation, Monitoring / verifying actual 
risk. The eighth stage is also very important, but it should be covered by the Group Feedback 
indicators. In addition, the stage on evaluating risk is covered by two separate indicators: one to 
evaluate the risk according to the identified scenarios, and a separate one to cover nominal risk, i.e. 
risks during normal operations within a hazard-free scenario, Coverage of nominal risk. The summary 
above also lists some remarks to particular stages. The first is on the safety targets. These targets 
should be set outside the safety assessment. The second remark is on a breakdown of the overall safety 
target into risk budgets for suboperations. Identification of safety targets and their breakdown is part of 
the scoping stage of the safety assessment process, but to stress its importance, it is covered by a 
separate indicator at Group Feedback (Safety Target breakdown). The third remark is on verification 
and validation. These should be part of each major stage in the safety assessment process, hence they 
could be covered by all stages. However, they can also be covered by indicators from a slightly 
different perspective: During the various stages of safety assessment, approximations (or assumptions) 
need to be made. This already starts during hazard identification: there is an implicit assumption that all 
important hazards are identified. But also during the risk modelling and risk evaluation, several 
approximations need to be adopted. Verification and validation steps should check if these are 
reasonable assumptions and if the deviation from reality is not too large. In order to capture this in our 
framework evaluation, we propose one additional indicator, namely, the extent to which the framework 
identifies and evaluates the approximations made, Approximations analysed, and an additional 
indicator on transparency: Transparency of safety assessment process. Finally, the summary above 
lists some additional qualities that could be desirable for the framework. Some of these qualities have 
already been partly covered by the indicators related to Group Feedback and Acceptability. Only the 
last one may be relevant: Level of safety expertise required by the framework, Level of safety 
expertise required. 
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 Phase 3: Consolidation of Indicators 
 
Through the Phase 2 analysis, 32 indicators have been developed. In Phase 3, these are further 
described and detailed, put in a more logical order, divided into six classes, and finally numbered CI-01 
through CI-32 (where CI denotes consolidated indicator). See Tables 2 through 7 below. The last 
column indicates for traceability reasons the initial group in which the indicator was developed. The six 
classes are developed by an iterative process, and are based as much as possible on different stages in 
safety assessment of a safety critical operation (ref. 11). 
 
Table 2 — Indicators Related to the Scoping of Safety Validation 
CI-01 Information / data 
needed 
How well can the method produce effective results if there is 
only limited input information available from operational 
concept designers? 
Feedback 
CI-02 Scoping the 
assessment 
How well does the framework handle Scoping the assessment 
stage, which entails writing a safety plan that specifies the scope 
of the safety assessment and outlines a “route map” for the 
safety assessment? How well is the safety target defined outside 
the safety assessment? 
Method 
CI-03 Safety Target 
breakdown 
Does the method support a breakdown of the safety target to the 
level of detail required, during all stages of the lifecycle? 
Feedback 
CI-04 Learning the nominal 
operation 
How well is learning of the nominal operation handled, i.e. 
learning to understand the operation and systems as they should 
work or function?  
Method 
 
Table 3 — Indicators Related to Coverage of Certain Aspects of the Operational Concept 
CI-05 Identifying hazards How well are hazards identified? How well does the method 
support the identification of future hazards, i.e. hazards that may 
not be known yet, but may occur in future operations? Does the 
hazard identification cover all aspects of the future operation? 
Method 
CI-06 Coverage of technical 
systems 
How well are technical systems (hardware and software) 
covered, including technical systems that can be expected for 
future operations? 
Applicati
on 
CI-07 Coverage of human 
factors for risk 
How well are human factors covered from risk perspective, 
including human factors that can be expected for future 
operations? 
Applicati
on 
CI-08 Coverage of human 
factors for human 
How well are human factors covered from human perspective, 
including human factors that can be expected for future 
operations? 
Applicati
on 
CI-09 Interactions and 
environment 
How well is the coverage by the method of interactions  
between multiple agents in the operation (e.g. air traffic 
controller, pilot, military ATM, navigation and surveillance 
equipment, search and rescue),  
with the environment of the operation? 
Feedback 
CI-10 Coverage of 
procedures 
How well are procedures covered, including procedures that can 
be expected for future operations? 
Applicati
on 
CI-11 Coverage of 
organisation 
How well is the organisation within and between stakeholders 
covered, including organisation that can be expected for future 
operations? 
Applicati
on 
CI-12 Coverage of 
institutional elements 
How well are institutional elements covered, including 
institutional elements that can be expected for future 
operations? 
Applicati
on 
 
Table 4 — Indicators Related to Risk Assessment 
CI-13 Combining hazards How well are hazards combined, connected to safety-related 
scenarios and evaluated? 
Method 
CI-14 Evaluating risk How well does the framework evaluate the risk according to the 
identified scenarios?  
Method 
CI-15 Coverage of nominal 
risk 
How well does the method address the risks during normal 
(nominal) operations, i.e. the systems and procedures are 
Method 
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 designed and a hazard-free scenario is being considered? 
CI-16 Approximations 
analysed 
How well does the framework identify and evaluate 
approximations made with respect to reality? 
Method 
 
Table 5 — Indicators Related to Feedback to ConOps Development 
CI-17 Feedback and 
communication  
How well is feedback (if any) communicated with operation 
design? 
Feedback 
CI-18 Supporting risk 
mitigation 
How well does the framework support the identification of 
effective risk mitigation strategies? 
Method 
CI-19 Monitoring / 
verifying actual risk 
How well does the framework support the monitoring and 
verification of actual risk? 
Method 
 
Table 6 — Indicators Related to Organisation of Safety Assessment 
CI-20 Resource 
requirements 
(equipment and 
personnel)  
Is the level of resources needed reasonable for the results 
delivered (where resources refers to number of personnel, their 
training, availability and length of their time required by the 
study, as well as equipment and administrative support 
requirements)? 
Acceptab
ility 
CI-21 Criticism Is the method able to withstand criticism? Acceptab
ility 
CI-22 Level of safety 
expertise required 
How well does the method pose requirements on the designated 
safety assessor to have the proper operational safety expertise 
background? 
Method 
CI-23 Documentability of 
process steps 
What is the degree to which the framework lends itself to 
auditable documentation?  
Acceptab
ility 
CI-24 Consistency How well is the consistency of the use of the framework, such 
that if used on two occasions by independent experts, 
reasonably similar results are derived?  
Acceptab
ility 
CI-25 Compliance to 
ESARRs, CR, ICAO 
How well is the level of compliance to: ESARRs, EC’s 
Common Requirements, ICAO requirements, or other 
international requirements (e.g. aircraft-related certification / 
performance requirements relevant for air traffic) 
Complia
nce 
CI-26 Flexibility In case of a modification in the operational concept description 
when the safety assessment is already ongoing: How much 
additional time / effort is required to update the safety 
assessment accordingly? 
Feedback 
 
Table 7 — Indicators Related to Supporting Decision and Policy Makers 
CI-27 Transparency 
regarding 
applicability 
To what extent does it become clear which applications (e.g. air 
transport operations, aircraft flight, runway incursions, Single 
European Sky) are accommodated? 
Applicati
on 
CI-28 Transparency of 
results 
How well is the transparency of the results, where transparency 
is defined as Understandable, Traceable, and Well documented 
Feedback 
CI-29 Transparency of 
safety assessment 
process 
To what extent are the steps in the safety assessment process or 
framework transparent to the safety assessor? 
Method 
CI-30 Support to decision 
makers 
How well does the method provide support to decision makers? Feedback 
CI-31 Support to regulatory 
authorities 
How well does the method support presentation to and 
communication with regulatory authorities? 
Feedback 
CI-32 Support to safety 
oversight 
How well does the method support checking / verification by 
safety oversight? 
Feedback 
 
 
Phase 4: Needs for improvement in air transport safety validation 
 
A logical next step after the consolidated indicator development process would be to go start 
developing a safety assessment framework that satisfies all these CIs. However, the development of a 
new safety assessment framework from scratch is challenging, and could take many years. A more 
  
NLR-TP-2007-978 
  
 8 
 realistic approach is to first evaluate if there are established safety assessment methods that already 
satisfy the CIs. Since the method we are looking for is aimed at getting international acceptability, a 
most logical choice for this is to start with a few safety assessment methods that are already widely 
carried and widely used within the international aviation community.  
 
There are several advantages of using established methods as reference point: First of all, there is no 
reason to try to invent the wheel again: Established methods typically are the result of many years of 
thinking and developing, and may already satisfy several of the CIs. In addition, established methods 
have been applied by many, and to many practical situations, which gives us practical insight in the 
advantages and disadvantages of the method in relation with their interactions with operational concept 
design. And finally, established methods usually already have support from part of the international 
community, hence this part does not have to be convinced anymore of using the method as a reference. 
 
This section aims to identify to what extent the CIs developed above can be satisfied by using a safety 
assessment method that is established within Eurocontrol, and to identify needs for improvement in 
order for it to be used for the safety validation of major changes in air transport operations. As a 
fortunate side effect, this exercise should also provide insight into the effectiveness, usefulness and 
completeness of the developed CIs. This evaluation process has been done twice: the results of the first 
cycle have been used to improve the CIs. The results of the second cycle are presented next. 
 
Evaluation of Established Safety Assessment Approach:  The first step was to identify one or more 
established safety methods, by using the criterion “widely carried and widely used within the 
international aviation community”. There appeared to be several candidates, but for this paper we 
present the analysis results of only one, i.e. the safety validation method as applied to a final approach 
operation that is supported by GBAS (Ground-Based Augmentation System); the results of this safety 
validation are documented in references 12 and 13.  
 
The safety validation method used is based on EATMP SAM (ref. 3), which is a safety assessment 
methodology widely used by European ANSPs (ref. 6). The reason why we opted to evaluate 
references 12 and 13 rather than reference 3 itself is explained by the formal methodology description 
leaving freedom in how to execute the different methodology steps. There is a lot of guidelines material, 
and in addition, there is course material, and safety case material for several actual applications. This 
yields that both in theory and in practice still different choices can be and are being made (e.g. there is 
freedom to choose a particular technique for an analysis step, in favour of another), and these choices 
affect the evaluation against the consolidated indicators. For this reason, the approach taken in this step 
is to select one representative application (a practice) of the method to a particular operation, and to 
only evaluate the method as conducted by this particular application. Advantages of selecting a practice 
rather than theory are that only practice can show if the theory works, and that the number of possible 
choices for conducting the method has been reduced to only one. A disadvantage is that the choices 
made for applying the method to different practices may not always be the same. However, after 
weighing all advantages and disadvantages of this and other approaches, it was identified as the option 
to follow.  
 
We also note that although the authors of references 12 and 13 consider this example representative for 
reference 3, we should note that there are larger changes in air transport operations needed than GBAS 
alone, hence an evaluation of references 12 and 13 against CIs that were developed for major changes 
involves the need for expert extrapolation and judgement. In such cases the outcomes have been 
discussed with Eurocontrol experts in order to avoid a significant bias by the evaluators. 
 
Another issue to be covered is what scoring system to use to present the evaluation results? In the 
beginning, we tried out several kinds of scoring mechanisms expressing the extent to which the method 
satisfied the indicator. For example, + / 0 / − was expressing that the method scored well / average / not 
sufficiently well. The drawback of this approach is that it distracts the evaluation away from the 
objective of identifying areas for improvement. The alternative scoring of *** / ** / *, indicating level 
of coverage by the method of an indicator has the same drawback. A third version was to identify 
suggestions for improvement of the method to better cover the indicator. These suggestions needed to 
be concrete and a positive approach needed to be maintained. Because the third option was seen as the 
most constructive, it was selected as the option to follow. 
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 Needs for Improvement Initially Identified:  Next, the safety method used in references 12 and 13 was 
analysed and evaluated against each of the CIs (except those in Table 7), and in case the method did not 
completely satisfy a CI, a need for improvement is initially identified. It appeared that often, one need 
for improvement could be related to more than one CI. Therefore, we subsequently consolidated the set 
of needs for improvement and related each need to a set of CIs that would further profit if this need 
would be satisfied. The table below provides the needs for improvement identified, together with the 
subset of CIs that would profit. The last column of the table gives the possible consequences if this 
need is not satisfied, which motivates why the need for improvement is very relevant to provide a 
sound safety case for the major changes in air transport operations envisioned for this paper. 
 
Table 8 — Needs for Improvement of Safety Validation According to GBAS to Further Meeting the 
Developed CIs 
Need for improvement Related 
indicators 
Consequences if need is not satisfied 
Organise training curricula to 
deliver high-level safety experts, in 
which safety experts are taught to 
have a responsibility towards the 
safety methods they are using 
CI-20, CI-22 If this is not done, consequence may be that methods are 
used without attention to their drawbacks. Another 
consequence may be that safety experts go too much 
into technical detail, and as a result do not stimulate the 
operational concept designers to think beyond technical 
detail either. 
Work with higher-level operational 
concept description that is 
described in a goal-oriented way 
per human agent, and that covers 
organisational and institutional 
aspects 
CI-02, CI-03, 
CI-04, CI-06, 
CI-10, CI-11, 
CI-12, CI-27 
If this need is not satisfied, consequence is that 
organisational and institutional aspects will not be 
considered, and hazards related to these aspects are not 
taken into account. Another consequence may be that 
there is no harmonisation between safety target setting/ 
scoping and the joint goals setting of the stakeholders 
involved in the operation. 
Use hazard identification methods 
that complement the ones used, in 
order to push the boundary between 
‘imaginable’ and ‘unimaginable’ 
hazards 
CI-01, CI-05, 
CI-07, CI-09, 
CI-10, CI-11 
If this need is not satisfied, consequence is that there is 
no view on multiple aspects of the whole spectrum of 
hazards, only hazards in the ‘corners’ (see figure) may 
be considered. Areas of the spectrum of hazards that are 
not identified will not be taken into account in the 
operational concept. 
Coverage of part ('corner') 
of spectrum  of hazards
Coverage of m ultip le aspects
of spectrum  of hazards
W hole spectrum  of hazards
 
Avoid the need for fixed event 
sequences in scenarios and cover 
hazards more explicitly; go beyond 
human error thinking and address 
human factors from a human 
perspective, cover interactions 
between multiple agents of the 
operation, and with the 
environment, give appropriate 
attention to goal-directed use and 
prioritisation of procedures and 
bring organisational and 
institutional issues into account 
CI-06, CI-07, 
CI-08, CI-09, 
CI-10, CI-11, 
CI-13, CI-14, 
CI-15, CI-26 
If this need is not satisfied, consequence is that there is 
no way to analyse particular types of hazards, 
specifically hazards that go beyond technical failures 
and human error. Without proper support to analyse 
these types of hazards, it is not possible to learn 
understanding their safety impact well, and to explain 
this well to operational concept designers. Hence these 
effects are not likely taken into account in the design. 
Improve systematic safety data 
collection and safety performance 
monitoring 
CI-16, CI-19 There are multiple consequences if this need is not 
satisfied: There will be less insight in current risks, 
hence less insight in benchmark for the future. Another 
consequence is that an opportunity is missed to identify 
several interesting hazards that occur today, but that 
have not been identified yet. These hazards, if not 
identified, can also not be monitored for future designs. 
Identify all assumptions adopted 
during the risk assessment, 
CI-16, CI-17, 
CI-28, CI-23 
If this need is not satisfied, consequence is that 
important safety effects that are hidden in assumptions 
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 Need for improvement Related 
indicators 
Consequences if need is not satisfied 
implicitly and explicitly, and 
evaluate them against reality; 
identify what has not been covered 
by the safety assessment and 
communicate this to the operation 
concept designers 
remain invisible. In addition, a missing proper analysis 
and explanation of all assumptions may lead to 
miscommunication with operational concept designers, 
who may be led to believe that important design issues 
are ‘reasoned away’ in assumptions. 
Leave the identification of 
operational mitigating measures to 
operation designers, but provide 
them with proper support 
CI-17, CI-18 First of all, safety experts may have a less realistic 
insight in the operational consequences (i.e. from a pilot 
or controller point of view) of certain mitigating 
measures than operation designers do. In addition, safety 
experts who have identified mitigating measures 
themselves, may find it difficult to do an objective 
safety analysis of these same measures.  
Study compliance to CR and ICAO 
requirements 
CI-25 Consequence of non-compliance to these requirements 
may be that there is less harmonisation and 
standardisation of advanced operational concept 
development, e.g. between countries. In addition, it 
should be taken into account that the requirements 
themselves may also need to evolve through time; e.g. 
current safety design targets may not be applicable to 
future operations. 
Study how one can evaluate a 
method against the following 
indicators: Criticism, Consistency, 
Transparency, Support to decision 
makers, Support to regulatory 
authorities, Support to safety 
oversight 
CI-21, CI-24, 
CI-29, CI-30, 
CI-31, CI-32 
If these indicators are not well understood, there is a 
chance that safety methods do not satisfy these and other 
indicators. Consequence may be that e.g. important key 
decision makers will get insufficient information to 
review safety cases, and to make proper decisions. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper developed a set of quality indicators for safety validation of major changes in air transport 
operations. Through a process of analysis, evaluation, synthesis and review, a consolidated set of 32 
indicators was developed for measuring to what extent a given safety validation method can be used to 
develop a good safety case for such major change. These indicators were initially verified and tested on 
an established safety assessment approach. As a result of this, we identified in an objective way several 
needs for improvement of the established safety assessment approach in support of the safety validation 
of future major changes in air transport. This forms a clear illustration of the practical use of the 
developed set of consolidated indicators of safety validation quality.  
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